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The power of judicial review of federal statutes in American constitutional history has the
mystique of the Hammer of Thor. Striking a congressional act down as violative of the United
States Constitution has attracted the interest of several generations of constitutional scholars.
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An Accelerating Curve
ROGER HANDBERG*
The power of judicial review of federal statutes in American constitu-
tional history has the mystique of the Hammer of Thor. Striking a
congressional act down as violative of the United States Constitution
has attracted the interest of several generations of constitutional schol-
ars. The Court, depending upon one's substantive views on the particu-
lar case at hand, is either seen as exercising a great power in defense of
liberty-political or economic-or is perceived as a usurper of the pow-
ers of the political branches of government. Whatever the substantive
events, great controversy and attention have been focused upon this
relatively rarely exercised Court power.' The data presented here indi-
cate that the United States Supreme Court and the present justices on
that Court operate on the assumption that judicial review is not politi-
cally provocative nor in fact an extreme power. This view is one founded
not upon the syllogisms of the justices, but upon their behavior patterns
over the last 175 years (1801-1976). The discussion here is premised
upon a literature (both in the legal and social science disciplines) that
has been greatly concerned with the role of the Supreme Court in pro-
tecting oppressed minorities. Majorities have been identified as cotermi-
nous with the dominant groupings in the legislative and executive
branches of government. Given the increased sense of alienation and
distrust about the federal government present in the populace, one could
legitimately question the accuracy of such an identification.' As a short-
hand notation, legislative majorities can be equated with the popular
majorities, but the fit is not always exact.
*Ph.D.; Associate Professor of Political Science, Florida Technological Univer-
sity.
1. Examples of such discussions include: L. LUSKY, BY WHAT RIGHT? (1975); A.
BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962); P. KURLAND, POLITICS, THE CONSTI-
TUTION, AND THE WARREN COURT (1970); and L. LEVY, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE
SUPREME COURT (1967).
2. Abramson, Generational Change and the Decline of Party Identification in
America: 1952-1974, 70 AM. POL. ScI. REV. 469 (1976).
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Richard Funston's article, "The Supreme Court and Critical
Elections,"3 developed an elaborate argument about the Court's activi-
ties whenever it acted in what was termed an "antimajoritarian" con-
text: i.e., striking down a congressional statute. The issue examined was
whether "[diuring realignment phases or, as they might be called, criti-
cal periods . . . the tendency of the Court to declare federal legislation
unconstitutional [was] significantly greater than during non-critical pe-
riods of stable party competition." 4 The realignments referred to by
Funston and in this paper are the periods where significant and enduring
shifts in party allegiance occurred in the political electorate. The results
of these realignments could be either the destruction of an old political
party, use of a new political party, or a change in the party's bases of
support. For example, the present party era typified by Democratic
Party dominance grew out of shifts in the late 1920's to early 1930's of
the working-class votes from the Republican to the Democratic Party.
The dramatic shift was best seen in the unionized ethnic Catholic seg-
ments of the electorate.' A period of transition occurred during each
realignment when the old forces still controlled parts of the federal
government. Therefore, the newly dominant political coalition might
take between four and eight years to come to power. The analysis by
Funston was an attempt to refute or to modify Robert Dahl's famous
article which had strongly questioned the Supreme Court's willingness
to defend minorities (oppressed or otherwise).'
In Funston's analysis, the Court was found to behave in a pattern
suggestive of what might be termed a disequilibrium or lag model. That
is: the Court as a whole and the individual justices active during a
particular period of transition hold views that are out of touch with the
new national political majority.7 Through an inevitable process of attri-
tion (retirements and death), the "old" justices are replaced by the new
judicial incumbents whose views are more consonant with the power-
holders in the executive and legislative branches. By the end of a four
to eight year period, the Court (in effect) through membership change
rejoins the dominant political coalition. Exceptions to this pattern occur
3. Funston, The Supreme Court and Critical Elections, 69 AM. POL. Sci. REV.
795 (1975).
4. Id. at 804.
5. H. ASHER, PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS AND AMERICAN POLITICS (1976).
6. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National
Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279 (1957).
7. Funston, supra note 3.
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when justices fail to leave the bench in the normal cycle. A president
makes new appointments on the average of one every twenty-two
months. In the 1930's, the new political coalition was unable to make
an appointment for over four years. In that situation, however, once the
logjam was broken, enough new appointments were made in three years
to constitute a "new" Court.' Professors Canon and Ulmer in a reana-
lysis of the Funston data (with several corrections) concluded that the
null hypothesis of "no difference" between the critical and noncritical
historical periods could not be rejected. Their argument in part was
premised upon the skewness of the data, especially in the critical periods
of electoral realignment.9 The data relied upon are all instances where
the power of judicial review was exercised. Ultimately, Funston's and
Dahl's analyses hinge upon interpretations of the 1930's crisis rather
than upon the broader spectrum of Court activity over the past 180 or
so years.
Whatever the results of that particular dispute, both sides premise
their analyses upon the fundamental assumption that the exercise of the
power of judicial review over federal legislative acts is both an unusual
and potentially provocative action by the Court. The action is unusual
in that the power of judicial review is used relatively infrequently, and
provocative in that the action taken is a direct affront to the "political"
branches."0 This scenario is based upon a perception of the Court's
activities which developed in the early years of the Republic. Imagewise,
the Court is seen as timidly and craftily striking down an act of Con-
gress and then in effect taking shelter against a possible majoritarian
counter-attack. This particular image draws heavily upon the early
nineteenth-century cases, notably Marbury v. Madison" and Dred Scott
v. Sanford.12 Implicit in this scenario are two considerations: first, how
often should the power of judicial review be exercised; and, second,
should the Court speak with a unified voice, i.e., with minimal or no
dissent.
8. C. PRITCHETT, THE ROOSEVELT COURT (1948).
9. Canon & Ulmer, The Supreme Court and Critical Elections: A Dissent, 70 AM.
POL. Sci. REV. 1215, 1216 (1976).
10. H. ABRAHAM, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS ch. 8 (3d ed. 1975).
11. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803) (establishing the Supreme Court's power to
review legislative acts of Congress).
12. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857) (holding that Negroes were not "citizens" as
provided in the United States Constitution and therefore not entitled to sue in the courts
of the United States).
12:1978
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Chief Justice Marshall led the Court to exercise the power of judi-
cial review only once during his long tenure in office. Clearly, this
reluctance to move more precipitously was based upon the threat posed
to the Court and especially to Marshall by the Jeffersonian Republi-
cans. Broad areas of public policy were staked out by the Federalist-
dominated Supreme Court, but paths of tactical retreat were always left
open. The traditions established in these early days of the Court were
such that the power of judicial review was relatively rarely exercised.
The second consideration, that of a unified Court, is important in
minimizing the target presented to outside critics. When the Court
speaks as one, the outsider has increased difficulty in focusing his at-
tacks upon the particular policy. An inside critic (in this instance a
dissenting justice) is important because that individual makes criticism
of the decision legitimate. 13 This is also illustrated by the Dred Scott
case,14 where the Court, badly factionalized, undermined the credibility
of its own opinion on what was obviously a sensitive political issue.'5 As
a result of that debacle, the Court's prestige sank to political insignific-
ance until after the Civil War. This concern with unanimity was not
restricted just to questions of judicial review, but also included all ap-
pearances of uncertainty or ambiguity in the law. Chief Justice Taft
probably carried this concern to an extreme, but he was not alone in
his concern with the monolithic image of the law."
Table I attempts to consolidate the Court's history into five time
periods based upon Professor Funston's analysis. 7 These time periods
reflect major shifts in the American political party system. For example,
period one (1800-1828) saw the collapse of the Federalist Party. The end
of period two (1829-1860) saw the rise of the Republican Party to
power, while in period four (1897-1936) a reconstituted Republican
13. An example of the effectiveness of the inside critic was demonstrated by
Justices Burton, Harlan, and Clark's role in Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657
(1957)(Burton, Harlan, JJ., concurring; Clark, J., dissenting). Their opinions, criticizing
the Court's holding that a defendant is entitled to production of relevant documents
which are to be used against him at trial, contributed to the enactment of 18 U.S.C. §
3500, which delineated the procedure to be used in the production of such documents.
Act of September 2, 1957, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1976). See generally W. MURPHY, CON-
GRESS AND THE COURT ch. 6 (1962).
14. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
15. Scjimidhauser, Judicial Behavior and the Sectional Crisis of 1837-1860, 23 J.
OF POL. 615 (1961).
16. See A. MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE: PILLAR OF THE LAW (1956).
17. Funston, supra note 3.
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Table 1. PERIODS OF JUDICIAL ACTIVITY
Total Votes to A verage per Total Votes to A verage per
Cases Strike Down Decision Uphold Decision
1800-1828 1 6 0
1829-1860 1 7 2
1861-1896 21 156 (7.4) 25 (1.2)
1897-1936 51 361 (7.1) 88 (1.7)
1937-1976 39* 238 (6.1) 65 (1.67)
Source: H. ABRAHAM, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (3d ed. 1975); Canon & Ulmer, The Supreme
Court and Critical Elections: A Dissent, 70 AM. POL. Sc. REv. 1215 (1976); and cases cited in
the United States Reports. The historical periods are based upon Funston's earlier analysis com-
paring electoral realignment and judicial realignment.
*The Federal Election Commission case, Buckley v. Valeo, 96 S. Ct. 612 (1976), was recorded 7
to I even though the vote varied on the four provisions struck down. They key provision in terms
of being an affront to a co-ordinate political branch dealt with appointment of the FEC's member-
ship: Congress was told not to encroach on the presidential power of appointment.
Party continued in power until the Great Depression. 8 The realignment
periods are consolidated with the previous period of electoral stability,
since the realignment period (for the Court at least) is a continuation
of the past. Otherwise, Professor Funston's original thesis has no merit
since realignment would be coterminous for both the electoral and judi-
cial institutions. Professors Canon and Ulmer have adjusted Professor
Funston's time periods to conform more fully to what they see as the
more accurate periods of realignment. 9
In Table 1, the number of cases in which a federal law was nullified
during a particular time period (adjusted to the Canon-Ulmer criteria)
is presented along with the total vote in favor of nullification or support
of the laws and the average number of votes in the majority and dissent.
Data for this analysis are drawn from Professor Abraham's compilation
in The Judicial Process"' and from cases cited in the United States
Reports. One difference that occurs between this analysis and the earlier
studies is that Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co.2 is counted twice
18. See W. CHAMBERS & W. BURNHAM, THE AMERICAN PARTY SYSTEMS: STATES
OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT (1967).
19. Canon & Ulmer, supra note 9, Tables 2 and 3, at 1217.
20. H. ABRAHAM, supra note 10, Table 9, at 288-93.
21. 157 U.S. 429 (1895) (White, Harlan, JJ., dissenting), vacated on rehearing,
158 U.S. 601 (1895) (Harlan, Brown, White, and Jackson, JJ., dissenting). While the
Court vacated its original decision on rehearing, the result was the same. However, on
rehearing the Court extended its prior decision by holding that the provisions of the Act
5
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because the first reported decision was 6-2 in favor of nullification while
the second was 5-4 to strike down the Income Tax Act of 1894.2
A power of this reported magnitude should be unleashed relatively
infrequently. This maxim of judicial power is used to explain the relative
rarity of such decisions by the Court. What has been pointed out as a
probably more relevant explanation is that the Court's most important
political-legal function is that of a legitimator or "yea sayer" rather
than as a negative force or "nay sayer." More importantly, the role
of legitimator is supposedly ingrained at least partially into the Court's
traditions as, for example, in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley
Authority.24 The Ashwander rules presuppose or presume the constitu-
tionality of challenged statutes or governmental actions. The burden of
proof is placed upon the challenger. Clearly, in certain substantive areas
of law, this presumption does not hold, especially in civil liberties cases,
notably free speech. Not all justices have accepted this new presumption
of unconstitutionality, but the earlier tradition has clearly been broken.21
which taxed a person's income, whether from real or personal property, were unconstitu-
tional as direct taxes.
22. Ch. 349, 28 Stat. 509 (1894).
23. Adamany, Legitimacy, Realigning Elections, and the Supreme Court, 1973
Wis. L. REV. 790.
24. 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). Justice Brandeis set
forth seven rules which have been used and developed by the Court to avoid passing
upon constitutional questions. Those rules are:
1. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of legislation in a
friendly, non-adversary, proceeding, declining because to decide such questions
"is legitimate only in the last resort, and as a necessity in the determination of
real, earnest and vital controversy between individuals....
2. The Court will not "anticipate a question, of constitutional law in ad-
vance of the necessity of deciding it."
3. The Court will not "formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than
is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied."
4. The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly
presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which
the case may be disposed of.
5. The Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon complaint of
one who fails to show that he is injured by its operation.
6. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute at the
instance of one who has availed himself of its benefits.
7, "When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and
even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that
this Court will first ascertain whether a construetion of the statute is fairly possi-
ble by which the question may be avoided."
25. See L. LuSKY, supra note 1, for a discussion of United States v. Carolene
6
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This break in tradition is reflected in the time comparison pre-
sented in Table 1. After the initial period for the establishment of judi-
cial review, the Court has increasingly been willing to accept challenges
to the constitutionality of federal statues and to act favorably upon
those challenges. Such challenges are obviously motivated by different
values, as shown by the earlier laissez-faire capitalism of the pre-1937
Court"8 and the civil libertarian values of the post-1937 Court.z2 What-
ever the value orientation, the Court has moved to the position of exer-
cising the power relatively frequently (at least in historical terms). This
activism has persisted even into periods of relative controversy about the
Court's work. For instance, some members of the "old" Court were
willing to push the issue of activism to the point of a constitutional
crisis. During the Warren Court, there were adjustments to the political
winds in terms of activity level, but the overall trend was toward increas-
ing activism. Over the last decade, the Supreme Court has been averag-
ing nearly two such actions per term. More impressively, this trend has
held up throughout both the Warren and Burger Courts. The Burger
Court period (1969-1976) has been summarized as one of increased
activity on the part of the Court. In a short seven-year time period, the
Court has"voided provisions in twenty seven federal laws, established a
distinctive record in the areas of First Amendment freedoms and equal
protection and by unanimous decisions delivered some of the severest
blows to presidential power ever recorded in American history."2" Pro-
fessor Dionisopoulos' analysis, based upon a limited segment of Court
cases, is accurate, although generally these two periods in Court history
Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938), in which the Court stated that the presumption of
constitutionality may not be as far reaching when legislation is within a specific prohibi-
tion of the Constitution. Id. at 152-53 n.4.
26. See, e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhardt, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (holding that the prohi-
bition of the use of child labor to make products traveling in interstate commerce was
an unconstitutional restraint on commerce and was beyond the authority of Congress).
See also Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (holding that the provision of
the right of coal workers to organize and the allowance of collective bargaining to set
wage and hour agreements in the Guffey Coal Act were beyond the powers of Congress
under the commerce clause).
27. See, e.g., Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964) (declaring § 6
of the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, c.1024, 64 Stat. 993 (codified at 50
U.S.C. § 785 (1970)), holding that prohibiting a member of a registered Communist
organization from obtaining a passport was unconstitutional as a violation of the fifth
amendment, and of the right to travel).
28. Dionisopoulos, Judicial Review in the Textbooks, Div. OF EDUC. AFFAIRS
(D.E.A.) NEWS 1, 20 (1976).
2:1978
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have presented images much different in terms of substantive policy.29
The Warren Court was seen as the most consistently liberal activist
period in Court history, while the Burger Court has moved in a more
conservative direction. In any case, the trend identified in Table I has
apparently accelerated despite the addition of what have been termed
"judicial restraint" advocates to the Court.3" This activism is accen-
tuated when one considers that the Court deals formally with fewer
cases now than before.3' Apparently, restraint is a sometime thing.
A further concern is most succinctly identified as that of "massing
the Court." 2 Basically, the Chief Justice or other dominant individuals
on the Court are involved in an active effort to maximize support for
the decisions. Game theory could be applied easily in this context, given
the tradeoffs necessary to gain maximum voting support while main-
taining some coherence in the content of the decision. The optimal
strategy is to generate a unanimous Court with no concurring opinions.
In an analogous situation, Professor Ulmer has described the massive
personal effort by Chief Justice Warren required to produce such appar-
ent consensus in one very controversial case.33 Support maximization
or dissent suppression is necessary in order to minimize the vulnerability
of the Court to political or legal counter-attack. 4
Dissenters in a case of the presumed magnitude of one striking
down legislation are to be discouraged or co-opted. Recent examples (in
several policy areas) of this apparent concern about dissent have in-
cluded school desegregation cases until the 1970's and United States v.
Nixon 5 in 1974. In these cases, no federal statute stood in jeopardy,
but the Court operated in such a fashion as to maintain a united front.
In contrast, as is readily apparent in Table 1, the Court has apparently
become increasingly less concerned with controlling or minimizing dis-
sent when it strikes down congressional legislation. Rather, the norms
29. See W. THOMAS, THE BURGER COURT AND CIVIL LIBERTIES (1976).
30. S. WASBY, CONTINUITY AND CHANGE (1976).
31. Canon & Ulmer, supra note 9, at 1216; F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, THE
BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT at 60, 297 (1928).
32. See D. DANELSKI, THE INFLUENCE OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE IN THE DECISIONAL
PROCESS: W. MURPHY & C. PRITCHETT, COURTS, JUDGES AND POLITICS (1961); and
W. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY (1964).
33. See Ulmer, Earl Warren and the Brown Decision, 33 J. OF POL. 689 (1971),
for a discussion of Chief Justice Warren's efforts to bring about a united court in Brown
v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
34. See S. WASBY, THE IMPACT OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (1970).
35. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
8
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on the Court are now such that dissenting behavior in these cases follows
the general patterns of dissent on the Court as a whole-a pattern which
was established in the aftermath of the 1925 Judges' Bill and which was
strengthened during the Roosevelt Court. 6
Table 2. DISSENT PATTERN
Unanimous 3 or 4 Total Cases
Votes Dissenting Votes* During Time Period
1861-1896 42.9% (9) 19.0% (4) (21)
1897-1936 37.3% (19) 35.2% (18) (51)
1937-1976 25.6% (10) 43.6% (17) (39)
Total 34.2% (38) 35.1% (39) (11 1)t
Source: H. ABRAHAM, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (3d ed. 1975); Canon & Ulmer, The Supreme Court
and Critical Elections: A Dissent, 70 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1215 (1976); and cases cited in the United
States Reports.
*Where only eight or fewer justices participated, two dissenting votes are recorded as equivalent
to the three- or four-vote situation in a nine-person court.
tThe two earlier cases have been excluded from this stage of the analysis.
Table 2 further isolates this trend by focusing upon the declining
percentage of unanimous decisions that occur when a congressional
statute is struck down. Arguments which rely upon the fact that dissent
on the Court is more prevalent than ever before miss the point that
striking down federal statutes is not considered business as usual, at
least according to the conventional analyses of constitutional law and
history. The point made here is that, in fact, the behavior pattern is
similar to the Court's general behavior pattern." In Table 2, the per-
centage of unanimous votes is given along with the percentage of deci-
sions with three or four dissents. Clearly, the Court is moving to a
situation of relative disunity when it moves to strike down the statutes,
either state or federal. This is best illustrated by the discordant note
struck in two recent instances of judicial review. In Buckley v. Valeo s
36. S. HALPERN & K. VINES, DISSENT, THE JUDGES' BILL AND THE ROLE OF THE
U.S. SUPREME COURT (1974). See also PRITCHETT, supra note 8.
37. R. HANDBERG, JUDICIAL IDEOLOGY ON THE SUPREME COURT 1916-1969
(1977), Table 1; G. SCHUBERT, JUDICIAL MIND REVISITED (1974).
38. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (Burger, C.J., White, Marshall, Rehnquist, and Blackmun,
JJ., all filed separate opinions) (holding that provisions of the Federal Election Cam-
paign Act of 1971 limiting individual contributions to campaigns were constitutional
despite first amendment objections; but that provisions limiting expenditures by candi-
dates on their behalf, provisions limiting total expenditures in various campaigns, and
provisions limiting the amount which an individual could spend independently of a
9
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the opinion was a per curiam one, with five additional opinions by
individual justices; in National League of Cities v. Usery3 9 the vote was
5-4, with one concurring and two dissenting opinions. None of the jus-
tices appears bashful about either voting against the political branches
or explaining why he did so. In fact, the plethora of opinions makes it
increasingly difficult for the political branches to know what exactly was
decided and why.
What is apparent, however, is that the Court no longer holds to the
view that judicial review is such a terrible power that it should never be
used, and if used, only under certain controlled conditions. Rather, it
appears that elite (both judicial and elected) perceptions of the rules of
the game now accept the probability of such Court action. Disagreement
may occur between the "political" and judicial branches, but the issue
is one of substantive policy rather than of the judiciary's power to act.
This is most graphically illustrated by the Court's decision striking
down the campaign practice reforms which were passed in the aftermath
of Watergate." Congressional reaction was relatively muted and di-
rected primarily at the substantive question of how the reforms should
be revised in order to meet the Court's mandate and what the Congress
saw as political reality. One could argue that the debate over the Court's
power to act goes on, but the real issues are those of its power of
statutory construction and interpretation rather than of constitution-
ality.4
From this perspective, a strong argument can be made that Justice
Brandeis' concurring opinion in Ashwander2 was clearly a temporary
avowal of judicial restraint. This view of the judicial function had strong
policy implications in the 1930's, but those policy overtones no longer
hold. Rather, the Court's more recent activities in Baker v. Carr3 and
candidate, but relative to a candidate, were all invalid as impermissible abridgements
of the freedom of speech).
39. 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (Blackmun, J., concurring; Brennan, White, Marshall,
and Stevens, JJ., dissenting).
40. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
41. Casper, The Supreme Court and National Policy Making, 70 AM. POL. Sci.
REV. 50, 56-57 (1976).
42. 297 U.S. 288 (1936).
43. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). The Court set forth the following elements describing a
political question:
[A] textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordi-
nate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable
standards for resolving it; or for the impossibility of deciding without an initial
10
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Flast v. Cohen" indicate clearly the Court's willingness, if not eagerness,
to be policy relevant. The reinterpretation of the political-question doc-
trine in Baker opened up new vistas for Supreme Court activity. More
recently, the Court has backed away from some of the opportunities
that were opened by those cases, but the precedents have only been
partially distinguished, not extinguished.45 In a sense, the Ashwander
rules are a dinosaur of the past, although certain aspects are still main-
tained as convenient. In fact, it appears that Chief Justice Hughes in
1937 won the war but lost the battle, since the institution's ultimate
power of judicial review continues uncontrolled and is increasingly being
used. The only viable controls presently imposed on the exercise of the
power of judicial review are the individual justice's sense of discretion
and the possibility (though remote) of congressional retaliation. Either
the Supreme Court has acquired such sanctity as to be almost beyond
control or it has fallen to such levels as to be the subject only of indiffer-
ence. Given the relatively high prestige of the institution, one could
presume the former more than the latter. As a symbol, the Court may
stand somewhat removed from the political battle, but its actions make
clear that it is an active participant despite the protestations of its
members.
policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibil-
ity of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the
respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unques-
tioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on
one question.
id. at 217.
44. 392 U.S. 83 (1968) (holding that taxpayers have standing to challenge expend-
itures of tax money which are in violation of the establishment of religion clause of the
first amendment).
45. The Court has not followed through on the potential inherent in Flast. See
United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974). In Richardson, the Court denied
standing to a taxpayer seeking to compel the Central Intelligence Agency to disclose a
detailed account of its expenditures. The Court distinguished the facts of the present
case from Flast, stating that the respondent did not claim a violation of a constitutional
limitation upon the taxing and spending power, but rather sought to obtain information
about how those funds were spent. Therefore, the Court concluded, there was no
"logical nexus" between the respondent's status of taxpayer and the failure of Congress
to require the detailed report of expenditures. Id. at 175.
1 2:97
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